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We measure the cost of consumption fluctuations using an approach
that does not require the specification of preferences and instead uses
asset prices. We measure the marginal cost of consumption fluctuations,
the per unit benefit of a marginal reduction in consumption fluctuations expressed as a percentage of lifetime consumption. We find
that the gains from eliminating all consumption uncertainty are very
large. However, for consumption fluctuations corresponding to business cycle frequencies, we estimate the marginal cost to be between
0.08 percent and 0.49 percent of lifetime consumption.
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tions. With this measure, Lucas finds a very small cost of business cycles.
Subsequently, several studies have proposed estimates of this cost of
business cycles under alternative assumptions on preferences and consumption processes. As a function of these assumptions, estimates vary
widely across studies.1 In our paper, we measure the welfare cost of
business cycles through an approach that does not require the specification of consumer preferences; instead, we directly use financial market data.
We define the marginal cost of consumption fluctuations as the per unit
benefit of a marginal reduction in consumption fluctuations. Because
it is marginal, we can relate this cost directly to asset prices. In particular,
we show the marginal cost to be equal to the ratio of the prices of two
long-lived securities: one representing a claim to stabilized consumption,
the other a claim to actual consumption. Measuring the cost of economic fluctuations then becomes a task in asset pricing.
The literature has in general focused on the potential benefits of
eliminating all consumption uncertainty, that is, replacing the actual
consumption process by its expected path. We take this as a starting
point of our analysis, but we also focus specifically on the welfare gain
of eliminating business cycle fluctuations without eliminating all consumption risk. We believe that this difference is important because a
large part of consumption fluctuations may not be directly related to
business cycles and as such to policies related to business cycle stabilization. On the basis of no-arbitrage principles, we derive simple expressions for the marginal benefit of eliminating all uncertainty and for
the benefit of eliminating business cycle fluctuations. These expressions
are simple functions of an interest rate, the average growth rate of
consumption, a consumption risk premium, and the moving average
coefficients that define the process for stabilized consumption.
Estimating the marginal cost presents two challenges. First, we need
to price a nontraded security, an equity claim to consumption. To do
this, we use an extension of the method proposed by Cochrane and
Saa-Requejo (2000) that is based on no-arbitrage restrictions when existing assets do not completely span the payoff of the asset to be priced.
A second issue concerns the measurement of the business cycle components of consumption. We use a frequency domain approach following the work of Baxter and King (1998, 1999). This application is complicated because our requirement that the stabilized consumption be
1
See, e.g., Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Obstfeld (1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1995),
Dolmas (1998), Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), Krusell and Smith (1999), Tallarini
(2000), Otrok (2001), and Lucas (2003) for a recent survey of this literature; for the
related literature on the welfare gains from international integration, see Lewis (1996)
and van Wincoop (1999).
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defined as the dividend of a security precludes the use of the standard
two-sided moving average representation.
We have two sets of quantitative results. First, our estimate of the cost
of all consumption uncertainty, while noisy, is extremely high. Essentially, offering agents a perpetual bond whose coupons are growing at
the average growth rate of the economy would be extremely valuable.
On the other hand, the cost of business cycle fluctuations is found to
be small. We find that the costs of business cycle fluctuations are between
0.08 percent and 0.49 percent of consumption. This finding is robust
to, among other things, the set of reference security returns used for
pricing consumption risk, the specifications of the stochastic processes
of consumption and returns, the possible imperfections of the frequency
domain filters we use, and the introduction of durable goods consumption.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section I we define the marginal
cost and present characterizations in terms of yields and growth rates.
Sections II, III, and IV contain the detailed empirical analysis. Section
V presents analytical results about the marginal cost and its relationship
to Lucas’s approach of measuring the cost of business cycles.
I.

The Marginal Cost of Consumption Fluctuations

We start this section by defining the marginal cost of consumption fluctuations. We characterize this cost for two definitions of consumption
fluctuations. The first includes all consumption uncertainty, and the
second covers business cycle fluctuations. In both cases we derive expressions for the marginal cost as functions of three variables: an interest
rate, the average growth rate of consumption, and a consumption risk
premium. We then quantify the marginal costs using the values of these
variables estimated in Sections II and III of the paper.
A.

Defining the Marginal Cost of Consumption Fluctuations

Assume that {x} is a stochastic process for payoffs, that is, a stream of
random payoffs for all dates t ≥ 1, and that V0[{x}] is the time 0 price
of a security that pays {x}. Consider the processes {c} that represent
aggregate consumption and {C } a more stable version of aggregate consumption, which we call trend. We define the marginal cost of consumption fluctuations q 0 as the ratio of the values of two securities: a
claim to the consumption trend, V0[{C }], and a claim to aggregate consumption, V0[{c}]:
q0 {

V0[{C }]
⫺ 1.
V0[{c}]

(1)
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If an agent can trade these two securities, the difference in prices
V0[{C }] ⫺ V0[{c}] measures the benefit of removing the business cycle
fluctuations from this agent’s consumption. This is achieved by selling
the aggregate consumption process {c} and buying the consumption
trend {C }. In equation (1), q 0 expresses this cost in terms of V0[{c}], the
value of aggregate consumption {c}.
Estimating the marginal cost q 0 in (1) presents two challenges, which
occupy most of the body of the paper. We need to develop a workable
definition of {C }, and we need to measure the prices V0[{C }] and
V0[{c}], which may not be directly observable.
We provide here an interpretation of the marginal cost q 0 for the
particular case of a representative agent economy.2 Assume that in each
period t, the economy experiences one of finitely many events z t 苸 Z,
and denote by z t p (z 0 , z 1 , … , z t) the history of events up through and
including period t. We index commodities by histories, so we write
x : Z r R ⫹, where Z { 写 t≥1 Z t, or simply {x} p {x t(z t) : Gt ≥ 1, z t 苸 Z t }. Let
U(7) be a utility function, mapping consumption processes into R. We
define the total cost of consumption fluctuations function Q(a) as the
solution of
U([1 ⫹ Q(a)]{c}) p U((1 ⫺ a){c} ⫹ a{C }),

(2)

where a 苸 [0, 1], c : Z r R ⫹, and C : Z r R ⫹. Without writing it explicitly,
we assume that c 0(z 0 ) enters the utility function in (2) in such a way as
not to be multiplied by 1 ⫹ Q(a) and that c 0(z 0 ) p C 0(z 0 ). The scalar a
measures the fraction of consumption {c} that has been replaced by the
less risky trend consumption {C }. The total cost function gives the total
benefit from reducing consumption fluctuations as a function of the
fraction of the reduction in fluctuations. It is straightforward to see that
Q(0) p 0, since no reduction in fluctuations generates no benefit. Thus
Q (0) is the first-order approximation of Q(1) around a p 0.3 We find
Q (0) a useful approximation of Q(1) because we can estimate Q (0)
using asset prices; indeed Q (0) p q 0. To see this, assuming that U is
t
differentiable with respect to each c(z
) for all t and z t and denoting the
t
t
partial derivatives by Uzt({c}) { ⭸U({c})/⭸c(z
), we obtain
t

冘 冘 U ({c}) 7 [C (z ) ⫺ c(z )]
Q (0) p
.
冘 冘 U ({c}) 7 c(z )
⬁



tp1

zt苸Z t

t

zt

t

t

t

⬁

tp1

zt苸Z t

zt

t

(3)

t

2

We present a nonrepresentative agent interpretation in Sec. V below.
In Sec. V below, we present a more detailed analysis of Q(7) and a comparison of q0
with the cost used in Lucas (1987).
3
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Furthermore, notice that the shadow price of a security with payoff
{x} for the agent with consumption {c} must be

冘冘
⬁

V0[{x}] {

1
U t({c}) 7 x t(z t).
Uz0({c}) tp1 zt苸Z t z

Combining this expression with (3), we obtain q 0 p Q (0).
B.

Cost of All Uncertainty

Consider a definition of C t that implies the elimination of all consumption uncertainty, namely,
C t p E 0ct.

(D1)

Assume that the unconditional expectation of consumption growth does
not depend on calendar time:
E

[ ]

ct⫹1
p 1 ⫹ g.
ct

(A1)

Hence, using the definition in equation (1), we have the marginal
cost of all uncertainty:
q0 p

r0 ⫺ g
⫺ 1,
y0 ⫺ g

where we define y 0 as the yield to maturity that corresponds to the price
V0({C t}), and likewise r0 for V0({ct}), implicitly by
V0({C })
1⫹g
p
c0
y0 ⫺ g

(D2)

V0({c})
1⫹g
p
,
c0
r0 ⫺ g

(D3)

and

which implies that y 0 1 g and r0 1 g.4
The yields to maturity y 0 and r0 are convenient transformations of the
prices obtained by setting the expected growth rates of consumption
for each period equal to its unconditional expectation g. Consistent with
the standard properties of yields to maturity, if consumption growth
4

Clearly,
V0({C })
1⫹g
p
p
c0
y0 ⫺ g

冘( ) 冘[
⬁

tp1

⬁

1⫹g t
E(ct/ct⫺1) t
p
,
1 ⫹ y0
1 ⫹ y0
tp1

]

and similarly for V0({c }).
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were independently and identically distributed (IID) and if one-period
interest rates were constant, then y 0 would be equal to the one-period
interest rate. Moreover, if consumption growth were IID and if dividendprice ratios were constant, then r0 would be the expected one-period
return to consumption equity.
As shown in table 1 below, for the period 1954–2001, the average per
capita growth rate of consumption g is 2.3 percent, and the average
yield after inflation for long-term government bonds is 3.0 percent. As
we shall discuss in the next section, we estimate the consumption risk
premium, r0 ⫺ y 0, to have a mean of at least 0.2 percent. Combining
these numbers gives us an estimate of the marginal cost of all uncertainty
of at least
q0 p

r0 ⫺ g
(0.030 ⫹ 0.002) ⫺ 0.023
⫺1p
⫺ 1 p 28.6%.
y0 ⫺ g
0.030 ⫺ 0.023

As we show below, substantially larger numbers can be obtained under
reasonable alternative assumptions. This finding highlights the fact that
security markets implicitly attach a very high value to a perpetual bond
whose coupons are growing at the average growth rate of per capita
consumption. Note that, as the yield y 0 gets close to the growth rate g,
this value tends to infinity. It is also clear that the formula for the cost
of all uncertainty is very sensitive to potential measurement errors in
r0, y 0, and g.
C.

Cost of Business Cycles

To consider business cycle fluctuations, we define the trend as a onesided moving average of consumption,
C t p a 0ct ⫹ a 1(1 ⫹ g)ct⫺1 ⫹ a 2(1 ⫹ g)2ct⫺2 ⫹ … ⫹ a K(1 ⫹ g)Kct⫺K

(D4)

for a vector of weights a p (a 0 , … , a K) satisfying

冘
K

a k p 1.

(A2)

kp0

Definition D4 and assumptions A1 and A2 imply that
E

(Cc ) p (1 ⫹ g),
t

t

0

so that, in expectation, the trend tracks consumption. We further assume
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that interest rates are constant and equal to y (A3) and that the following
initial conditions hold:
c0
c⫺1
c⫺K⫹1
p
p…p
p 1 ⫹ g.
c⫺1
c⫺2
c⫺K

(A4)

The next proposition derives an expression for the marginal cost of
business cycles q 0, as a function of r0, y, g, and a.
Proposition 1. Assume that discount bonds for all maturities and a
consumption equity claim are traded. Then, ruling out arbitrage opportunities, and under assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4, we have

冘 冘 ( )
⬁

q0 p

K

w 0,t

tp1

ak

kp0

1 ⫹ r0
1⫹y

min {t,k}

⫺ 1,

(4)

where the weights w 0,t are defined as
w 0,t {

r0 ⫺ g 1 ⫹ g t
.
1 ⫹ g 1 ⫹ r0

( )

(5)

The essence of the proof consists of a replication argument like the
ones used to price a derivative security, which in our case is the consumption trend. To this effect, we design portfolio strategies, one for
each time t, with payoffs that exactly replicate the realizations of the
consumption trend C t. To exactly replicate the payoffs, we use the linearity of the trend consumption and the assumption of constant interest
rates, so that portfolios of bonds can be rolled over into the future at
known interest rates. The details of the proof are in Appendix A. In
this argument, the assumption of constant interest rates can be replaced,
with no loss of generality, by the requirement that interest rates are
known in advance. Finally, we use the yield to maturity for the consumption equity r0 and the unconditional growth rate of consumption
g to state the formula for the marginal cost q 0, but we do not assume
that either the returns of the consumption equity or the consumption
growth rates are IID in this proposition.
Since the expression for (4) is complex, we introduce an approximation for the marginal cost:

冘
K

q 0 艑 (r0 ⫺ y) 7

a kk,

(6)

kp0

which is accurate for deviations from trend corresponding to business
cycle fluctuations; see Appendix B for a derivation and Section III below
for an illustration. Thus the marginal cost of business cycles is approximately equal to the consumption risk premium, a measure of the market price of risk, times a constant that depends on the moving average
coefficients, a measure of the volatility of the deviations from trend. For
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instance, let us compare the marginal costs q 0 and q 0 for two moving
average coefficient vectors a ≥ 0 and a  ≥ 0, respectively, and assume
that a  puts more weight on higher k’s, or formally that a  first-order
stochastically dominates a. If, furthermore, r0 1 y, then q 0 1 q 0 (this comparative static result holds for the exact expression [4]). The intuition
for this result is obvious for the extreme case in which a 0 p 1, so that
the deviations from trend will be identically zero, and hence q 0 p 0.
Finally, the following limiting case relates the marginal cost of business
cycles to the marginal cost of all uncertainty.
Proposition 2. Setting a 0 p a 1 p … p a K⫺1 p 0 and a K p 1 and
letting K go to infinity, under the assumptions A1–A4, we obtain that
q0 p

r0 ⫺ g
⫺ 1;
y⫺g

that is, the marginal cost of business cycles equals the marginal cost of
all uncertainty.
Consider selecting the moving average coefficients a so that the deviations from trend correspond to the conventional view that business
cycles last no more than eight years. As described later in the paper,
K
this results in a value of 冘kp0 a kk of 0.387. On the basis of the estimates
presented in the next section for the 1954–2001 period, we conclude
that the mean of the consumption risk premium r0 ⫺ y is between 0.2
percent and 1.3 percent. Thus, using equation (6), we estimate the mean
of the marginal cost of business cycles q 0 to be between 0.08 percent
and 0.49 percent.
II.

Valuing Consumption Equity

In this section, we present our estimates of the value of a security with
payoffs equal to aggregate consumption. We have shown that under the
assumption of constant interest rates y, we can compute the marginal
cost of business cycles as a simple function of the consumption growth
rate g, and the moving average weights defining business cycle fluctuations a, once we know the value of consumption equity, with implicit
yield to maturity r0. Valuing consumption equity is nontrivial because
this is not a traded security. We use as much as possible a preferencefree asset pricing approach to value consumption equity as a function
of other asset prices under the assumption of no arbitrage. However,
because consumption cannot be completely replicated by existing assets,
additional assumptions are needed. The first two estimates for r0 ⫺ y are
obtained by adapting the method developed by Cochrane and SaaRequejo (2000) for the computation of bounds on the price of a security
whose payoffs cannot be perfectly replicated by existing assets. The key
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of their method is to use the prices of observed portfolios as a reference,
together with a restriction on the highest possible Sharpe ratio to infer
plausible prices for the unobserved security. In addition to this, we also
present estimates based on a parametric model for the stochastic discount factor.
We are interested in finding the price, Vt, of a claim to an infinite
sequence of payoffs {ct⫹k }⬁kp1. To save on notation and to focus on the
main ideas, we start by assuming that the growth rates of the payoffs
are IID and that the price-dividend ratios vt { V/
t ct are constant; we
relax these assumptions later. In the IID case, we focus on the (constant)

price of a security with a single payoff c/
c { ct⫹1 /ct, denoted by qt. The
price-dividend ratio for the security that has payoff {ct⫹k /ct}⬁kp1 is then
given by v p q/(1 ⫺ q).5 Overall, we shall present three different estimates for q.
We assume that there is an observed set of J ⫹ 1 reference portfolios
with current price vector p and with the payoffs to be received next
period given by vector x. We assume that there is a risk-free asset among
these J ⫹ 1 reference portfolios. Our first estimate of the price q is
denoted by q*, and it is given by the price of the part of the consumption
payoff that is spanned by the reference portfolio x. That is, q* is the

price of a claim to blx, where c/
c p blx ⫹ u and u is orthogonal to x,
l
so it satisfies E[ux] p 0. Thus b x has the interpretation of the payoff
of a portfolio b of the reference assets, and hence its value equals blp.
We assume that the component u is priced as if it were a risk-free asset;
that is, it has no risk premium. Since x includes a risk-free asset, it must
be that E[u] p 0, and hence we have q* p bl 7 p.
Now we describe our second estimate of the price q, denoted by q,
which we take to be a lower bound of the price of the consumption
strip. For this, we find it useful to introduce the concept of a stochastic
discount factor. As is well known, no arbitrage guarantees the existence
of a stochastic discount factor m t⫹1 ≥ 0 that satisfies pt p E t[m t⫹1x t⫹1] for
all prices and payoffs pt and x t⫹1. An example of a valid stochastic discount factor in our setup is
m t⫹1(z t⫹1) p

Uzt⫹1/Uzt
,
P(z t⫹1Fz t)

where P is the probability measure on histories z t, and the Uzt are the
t
derivatives of U with respect to c(z
). Recall that the stochastic discount
t
5

By definition,
⬁

vt {

({ } ) (

Vt
ct⫹k
p Vt
ct
ct

p Vt

kp1

)

ct⫹1
,
ct(vt⫹1 ⫹ 1)

where we have also used Vt (7) to denote the price of a security with a single payout. Because
vt p vt⫹1 p v, we get v p (v ⫹ 1)Vt(ct⫹1/ct), and the claimed result follows.
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factor m t⫹1 is unique if and only if markets are complete. We define

q p E[mc/
c], where the discount factor m has been suitably restricted.
In particular, we follow Cochrane and Saa-Requejo by restricting the set
of stochastic discount factors to be consistent with the prices of the
reference payoffs and impose an upper bound on its volatility. Specifically, q solves


[ cc ]

q p min E m
m≥0

subject to (i) p p E[mx], (ii) m ≥ 0, and (iii) j(m)/E(m) ≤ h. Let R and
1 ⫹ y be any gross return and the gross risk-free rate. Then condition
iii limits the Sharpe ratio of any gross return R, defined as FE[R ⫺
(1 ⫹ y)]F/j(R), to be lower than h. To see this, notice that E[m[R ⫺
(1 ⫹ y)]] p 0, and hence
FE t[R ⫺ (1 ⫹ y)]F j(m)
≤ t
,
j(R)
E t(m)
t
with E(m) p 1/(1 ⫹ y). Thus j(m)/E
t
t(m) provides an upper bound to the
market price of risk, that is, the expected excess returns that one can trade
off at market prices per unit of risk, as measured by the standard deviation of the returns. In the language of Cochrane and Saa-Requejo,
portfolios with large Sharpe ratios are good deals, and hence restriction
iii on the discount factors is interpreted to mean that there should be
no deals that are “too good.”
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo show how the prices q* and q are related.
In particular, when it is assumed that the nonnegativity constraint ii is
not binding,
q p q* ⫺


1
冑(h 2 ⫺ h˜ 2 )冑(1 ⫺ R 2 )j c ,
1⫹y
c

()


where R 2 is the R 2 from the regression of c/
c on x and h˜ is the highest
Sharpe ratio that can be obtained with the reference assets. Clearly,

q ≤ q*. The difference between q* and q¯ depends on how well c/
c is
2
fitted by the reference assets x, as measured by the R , and on how far
the highest allowable Sharpe ratio h is from the highest Sharpe ratio
that is achievable with the reference portfolios h̃. This formula shows
that condition iii limits the size of the risk premium that is attributed

c not spanned by x. We estimate q and
to u, the part of the payoff c/
q* by replacing the population moments in the expression by their
sample analogues.
We relax the assumptions of IID growth rates for the payoffs and
constant price-dividend ratios by considering a setup with a Markov
regime-switching process. In particular, we let z t p (st, et) be as follows:
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let st be a Markov chain with s 苸 {1, 2, … , n} p S and transition function
p(s Fs), and let et 苸 E be independent of the history et⫺1 and with a
cumulative distribution function F(eFs) p Pr {et ≤ eFst p s}. We let consumption growth rates ct⫹1 /ct p 1 ⫹ g(z t⫹1) and reference payoffs
x t⫹1 p x(z t⫹1) be functions of z t⫹1, whereas the vector of prices of the
J ⫹ 1 reference assets pt p p(st) and the price-dividend ratio V/
t ct p
v(st) are functions of st. In Appendix C, we define operators whose fixed
points give the prices Vt */ct and V t/ct, corresponding, respectively, to the
parts of consumption equity spanned by the reference assets and the
lower bound of the value of consumption equity. For empirical implementation we consider two non-IID specifications: a two-state regimeswitching process and a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR), which
we further describe below.
Our third estimate for the price q is based on a parametric model
for the stochastic discount factor m t⫹1. We let log m t⫹1 be a linear function of aggregate consumption and the market return. This specification
is motivated by the Lucas asset pricing model for a utility function with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), where log m t is linear in the log
of consumption growth, as well as by the generalization of Epstein and
Zin (1991), which allows for a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution different from the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, where log m t⫹1 is linear in the log of consumption growth and
in the log return of consumption equity. In particular, we assume that
m t⫹1 is given by
m t⫹1 p d exp (lln t⫹1),

(7)

where n t⫹1 is a vector of “factors” with “loading” vector l and constant
d. Using reference payouts x t⫹1 with prices pt, we estimate the factor
loadings using generalized method of moments on

[

0 p E exp (lln t⫹1) 7

[

]

x t⫹1
⫺ (1 ⫹ y) .
pt

Then, under the assumption that the factors n t⫹1 and the returns
x t⫹1 /pt are IID, we estimate q through the sample analogue to

[

E exp (lln t⫹1) 7

[

]

ct⫹1 /ct
⫺ (1 ⫹ y) p 0.
q

Tables 1–3 contain our estimates of the value of consumption equity
for different specifications. Following Cochrane and Saa-Requejo, we
have assumed that the highest admissible Sharpe ratio is one in annual
terms. As they point out, this is a rather large number, since the observed
Sharpe ratio of a market portfolio is about 0.5, and this value is regarded
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TABLE 1
Marginal Cost of Consumption Fluctuations, q, IID Case, for Selected
Reference Portfolios
q
r⫺y
%
(1)

Upper
Bound (%)
(2)

Business Cycles
R2
(3)

%
(4)

All Uncertainty

Upper
Bound (%)
(5)

%
(6)

Upper
Bound (%)
(7)

A. 1954–2001 (yp2.96, gp2.27)
R(Market)
R(10dec)
R(17ind)

.19
.27
.20

1.17
1.00
.54

R(Market)

.56

3.30

R(10dec)
R(17ind)

.56
.44

2.22
1.67

.17
.38
.48

.07
.10
.07

.44
.38
.19

28.00
38.91
28.74

169.88
145.08
78.13

219.00

1,722.40

B. 1889–2001 (yp2.15, gp1.96)
.24

.21

1.25

C. 1927–2001 (yp2.16, gp1.93)
.44
.47

.21
.17

.84
.64

243.50
190.61

958.77
723.77

Note.—r ⫺ y stands for the consumption risk premium; R 2 comes from the regression of consumption growth on
returns. R(Market) stands for the CRSP value-weighted return covering NYSE and AMEX. R(10dec) stands for the
returns of the 10 CRSP size-decile portfolios. R(17ind) stands for the returns of the 17 industry portfolios from French’s
(2002) data. All returns are real.

by the equity premium literature as puzzlingly high. To facilitate the
use of the formulas derived in Section I, we express the value of consumption equity in yields to maturity in excess of the risk-free rate, which
we call the consumption risk premium; that is, r0 ⫺ y p (1 ⫹ g)/v 0 ⫹
g ⫺ y, for both v*0 and v 0. Since v 0 ≤ v*0 , the yield spread attributable to
v 0 determines the upper bound of the consumption risk premium.
Table 1 contains estimates of the consumption risk premium under
the assumptions of IID consumption growth and returns. We consider
three sets of reference portfolios. In addition to a risk-free rate, we use
either the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted
portfolio return covering the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 10 size-decile CRSP portfolios,
or 17 industry portfolios constructed by French (2002). Consumption
is defined as consumption expenditures on nondurables and services.
For the postwar period we find that the consumption risk premium of
the spanned part is between 0.19 percent and 0.27 percent, with upper
bounds between 0.54 percent and 1.17 percent, depending on the reference portfolios used.6 The best replication is achieved through the

17 industry portfolios, with an R 2 of .48 for the regression of c/
c onto
6
In computing the lower bound of the price, we do not explicitly impose nonnegativity
constraints on the stochastic discount factor. Imposing such constraints would tighten the
bound closer toward the price of the spanned component.
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TABLE 2
Marginal Cost of Consumption Fluctuations, q, Non-IID Cases, with the
Portfolio Best Fitting Consumption: 1954–2001
q
r⫺y
%
(1)

Business Cycles

Upper
Bound (%)
(2)

R2
(3)

%
(4)

Upper
Bound (%)
(5)

All Uncertainty
%
(6)

Upper
Bound (%)
(7)

A. VAR(1) for Consumption Growth and Returns
R(Market)
R(10dec)
R(17ind)

.11
.14
.28

R(Market)
R(10dec)
R(17ind)

.21
.27
.18

1.77
1.72
1.47

.02
.06
.48

.04
.05
.11

.67
.65
.56

16.08
20.94
40.43

256.84
249.67
213.67

B. Regime-Switching Process for Consumption Growth and Returns
1.64
1.35
1.14

.16
.38
.47

.08
.10
.07

.62
.51
.43

30.93
39.38
26.62

238.25
195.35
165.82

Note.—r ⫺ y is the unconditional mean of the consumption risk premium obtained from the model. R(Market)
stands for the CRSP value-weighted return covering the NYSE and AMEX. R(10dec) stands for the return of the
combination of the 10 CRSP size-decile portfolios that best replicate consumption in a least-squares sense. R(17ind)
stands for the return of the combination of 17 industry portfolios from French’s (2002) data that best replicate consumption in a least-squares sense. R 2 is the unconditional mean of the one-step-ahead R 2 obtained from the model in
a regression of consumption on returns. All returns are real.

real returns. Considering longer sample periods increases the estimated
consumption risk premium by about two to three times.
Table 2 reports results when we allow for departures from the IID
case. In panel A, we use a Markov chain approximation of a bivariate
VAR process with normal innovations consisting of the consumption
growth rate and one excess return. We consider bivariate VARs and
hence include only one excess return, given the cost to numerically
solve for prices q* and q. We consider three different specifications for
the excess returns, which correspond to the three cases considered in
table 1. For the two cases that cover several portfolios, that is, the 10
size-decile portfolios and the 17 industry portfolios, we use the combination of these returns that has the highest correlation with consumption. In panel B, we use a two-state Markov regime, where, conditional on the state, consumption growth and the excess return are
IID. We consider the same three specifications for the excess returns as
in the VAR(1) case. Regimes are assumed to be observable and to be
determined by splitting the sample into high and low growth rates of
consumption. The cutoff is set at 0.5 percent below the mean annual
growth rates in the sample, with the aim to capture the difference between recessions and expansions. We also explored alternative choices
for regimes based on the NBER chronology. These results are not reported since they resulted in little quantitative differences. We find that,
based on the spanned part, the consumption risk premium is between
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TABLE 3
Marginal Cost of Consumption Fluctuations, q, with Consumption as a Factor
q

Factors

Returns
(1)

r⫺y
(%)
(2)

Business
Cycles (%)
(3)

All
Uncertainty (%)
(4)

A. 1954–2001
DC
DC, R(Market)

Market
Market, R(10) ⫺ R(1)

1.11
.21

DC
DC, R(Market)

Market
Market, R(10) ⫺ R(1)

1.60
3.49

.42
.08

160.94
31.05

B. 1927–2001
.61
1.33

702.28
1,535.70

Note.—r ⫺ y is the consumption risk premium. R(Market) stands for the CRSP value-weighted return covering the
NYSE and AMEX. R(10) and R(1) are the largest and smallest of the 10 CRSP size-decile portfolios. All returns are
real. Logarithms are taken of the variables used as factors.

0.11 percent and 0.28 percent and the upper bound is between 1.14
percent and 1.77 percent, depending on whether the VAR or the twostate regime-switching process is used and depending on which excess
return is used.7
As a summary statistic of our main findings, we average the estimates
in tables 1 and 2 for the postwar period, thus obtaining a risk premium
of consumption equity of 0.2 percent for the part of consumption
spanned by existing assets with an upper good-deal bound of 1.3 percent.
While the value of the spanned part of consumption does not correspond to a lower bound according to the good-deal methodology, it
seems reasonable to take this estimate as a lower bound because our
prior beliefs would not be to attribute a negative risk premium to the
part of consumption that is not spanned by the returns in our sample.
On the other hand, we consider the upper good-deal bound of 1.3
percent truly as an upper bound for the risk premium of consumption
equity. Indeed, while it might be possible to come up with portfolios
with large average excess returns that are more strongly correlated with
consumption, our choice of a largest admissible Sharpe ratio of one
seems generous enough, given that this is about twice what is implied
by historical returns of a value-weighted market portfolio. Moreover,
explicitly imposing nonnegativity constraints would also tighten the
bounds for annual data frequencies.
Table 3 contains estimates of the consumption equity premium under
the parametric specification of the stochastic discount factor in (7). We
present results for two specifications. In the first row, we use the log
7
Table 2 does not report results for the longer sample period covering 1927–2001, since
this does not result in any significant changes compared to the corresponding IID cases
in table 1.
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consumption growth rate as the only factor in (7), following the Lucas
asset pricing model, and we choose the loading vector l to fit the excess
return of the market portfolio. In the second row, we consider a specification with two factors, the log consumption growth rate and the log
market return, and we choose the vector l to fit the market return and
the difference in return between the smallest and largest CRSP sizedecile portfolios. Column 2 shows that the consumption risk premium
is estimated to be 1.11 percent for the one-factor case and 0.21 percent
for the two-factor case. These values are in between the ones estimated
by the methods reported in columns 1 and 2 in tables 1 and 2.
A comparison of the results in table 3 to those in table 1 for the case
in which the aggregate stock market is used as the reference return
provides further insights. In table 3, with consumption growth as the
factor, the consumption risk premium, r ⫺ y, is estimated at 1.11 percent
for the postwar period. In table 1, the corresponding estimate of r ⫺
y is 0.19 percent. These two estimates are closely related. For the results
reported in table 3, we have
r⫺y艑

1
bRM,c /c

7 (r M ⫺ y),

(8)


where bRM,c /c is the slope coefficient in the regression of R M on c/
c,
M
M
M
r { E(R ) ⫺ 1 is the expected market return, and r ⫺ y is the market
equity premium. With consumption growth as the factor, the stochastic
discount factor given by equation (7) corresponds to the one implied
by CRRA utility. Thus, to the extent that the covariance of consumption
and the market return is small, as is well known from the equity premium
literature, the risk aversion required to explain the equity premium is
large, bRM,c /c is small, and the consumption risk premium r ⫺ y is relatively large.
For the corresponding case in table 1, we have

r ⫺ y 艑 bc /c,RM 7 (r M ⫺ y),

(9)

which is just the capital asset pricing model relationship. It is easy to

see that unless R M and c/
c are perfectly correlated, we have 1/bRM,c /c 1
bc /c,RM, and the ratio of the first to the second is given by [1/corr(R M,


c/
c)]2. In the case here, corr(R M, c/
c) is roughly equal to 0.4, so that
M

2
[1/corr(R , c/c)] 艑 6, which indeed corresponds approximately to the
ratio of the consumption risk premiums of 1.11/0.19. See Appendix D
for a derivation of (8) and (9).
We have further explored the sensitivity of our results to five sets of
auxiliary assumptions without reporting them here in detail. First, the
exact value of the risk-free rate used to estimate the consumption equity
premium r0 ⫺ y turns out not to be important. To a first approximation,
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our methods just estimate covariance risk. Second, we have considered
an alternative timing convention for combining consumption growth
rates and returns. For the benchmark case reported here, we have paired
consumption growth from year t to t ⫹ 1 with returns from the first to
the last day of year t. Alternatively, we have considered returns from the
last day of June in t until the last day of June in t ⫹ 1. The findings are
barely distinguishable across the two cases. Third, we have considered
quarterly data for the postwar period 1954–2001. In general, consumption risk premia are somewhat smaller (after annualization) than for
the annual results reported here. The robustness of our estimates across
specifications and return sets that we have reported for annual data also
holds for the quarterly period. Fourth, we have included the return
spread between long-term corporate bonds and government bonds from
Ibbotson Associates (2002) and found that the results were not sensitive
to the addition of these portfolios. Fifth, in the NBER working paper
version of this paper (Alvarez and Jermann 2000), we have considered
richer specifications of the stochastic discount factor (7), allowing for
non-IID returns—including variable interest rates—and consumption
growth rates in a multivariate VAR context; results were similar.

III.

Measuring Business Cycles

In this section, we describe the choice of the moving average coefficients
{a k } that determine the consumption trend {C }, as defined in D4 and
A2. We define the trend {C }, so that the deviations of consumption from
trend, ct ⫺ C t, are fluctuations that last eight years or less. Thus the trend
{C } contains fluctuations that last more than eight years. Our definition
of business cycles as fluctuations that last up to eight years is consistent
with the definition of Burns and Mitchell (1946) and also corresponds
approximately to the definition of business cycles implied by the widely
used Hodrick-Prescott filter for quarterly data with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.
We choose the moving average coefficients {a k } so as to represent a
low-pass filter that lets pass frequencies that correspond to cycles of
eight years and more. Low-pass filters are represented in the time domain by infinite-order two-sided moving averages. However, a requirement of our analysis is to have trend consumption in time t be a function
of information available at time t; thus our choice of a one-sided moving
average. To do this, we follow the approach presented by Baxter and
King (1998, 1999). Let b(v) be the frequency response function of the
desired low-pass filter, which in our case is equal to one for frequencies
lower than eight years and zero otherwise. Let aK(v) be the frequency
response function associated with a set of moving average coefficients
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K
k kp0

K
k kp0

{a } . We select the moving average coefficients {a }
so that aK approximates b. In particular, our choice of {a k } minimizes

冕

p

Fb(v) ⫺ aK(v)F2f(v)dv,

(10)

⫺p

where f(v) is a weighting function representing (an approximation to)
the spectral density of the series to be filtered. In this minimization, we
K
impose the condition aK(0) p 1, which implies that 冘kp0 a k p 1.
We use the spectral density of an AR(1) with an autoregressive coefficient of one as the weighting function f, because this matches approximately the spectral density of consumption. See also Alvarez and
Jermann (2002) for another view about how consumption fluctuations
are largely permanent. We set the number of lags K p 20. In our case,
using more coefficients does not significantly affect quantitative results;
with fewer coefficients, results are slightly different. The coefficients are
given in Appendix E.
The costs of business cycles corresponding to the estimates of consumption risk premiums that we discussed above are presented in tables
1–3. Take, for instance, table 2, the regime-switching case, labeled
R(17ind). In this case, the cost of business cycles is 0.07 percent based
on the spanned part of consumption as displayed in column 4, with
0.43 percent as an upper-bound estimate, as displayed in column 5.
All results reported in the tables are based on the exact formula
derived in proposition 1. We illustrate here the accuracy of the approximation given by equation (6). For instance, for the case just discussed, table 2 shows the consumption risk premium based on the
spanned part as 0.18 percent and that based on the good-deal upper
bound as 1.14 percent. For K p 20, with the optimal filter weights,
K
冘kp0
a kk p 0.387, so that the approximate cost of business cycles is 0.07
percent based on the spanned part with an approximate upper bound
of 0.44 percent.
Following our discussion in the previous section, we summarize the
main quantitative results by averaging the estimates of the marginal cost
q 0 based on postwar data presented in tables 1 and 2. We find the cost
of business cycles to be between 0.08 percent based on the spanned
part of consumption and 0.49 percent based on the upper good-deal
bound. As we discuss further below, these conclusions are quite robust
to alternative filters and the introduction of durable goods consumption.
A.

Discussion of One-Sided Filters

We provide here some discussion about the extent to which our results
are robust to the particular filter choice. As a specific requirement of
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Fig. 1.—Transfer function for low-pass filter with an eight-year cutoff: a, one-sided; b,
two-sided.

our analysis we need a one-sided filter. However, since this filter is onesided, it cannot avoid introducing a phase shift. As a result, the trend
lags the original series. In particular, the objective function displayed
in equation (10) can be written as the integral of the square of the
differences of the gains of the filters, [Fb(v)F ⫺ FaK(v)F]2, plus a term that
depends on the phase shift. This second term is zero if the filter has
no phase shift. Figure 1a illustrates this issue by plotting the transfer
function (the squared gain) of this filter. The transfer function should
be one in between the desired frequencies and zero for higher frequencies. Instead, it tends to let pass up to 30 percent of the variance
at higher frequencies, so that the computed trend contains a nonnegligible amount of cyclical variability. As shown in figure 1b, and as is
well known, two-sided band-pass filters fit the ideal filter’s step function
much more closely—remember that a symmetric two-sided filter does
not introduce a phase shift. The corresponding time domain represen-
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tation is in figure 2. Specifically, deviations from trend scaled by a
growth factor (ct ⫺ C t)/c 0(1 ⫹ g)t are shown for one-sided and two-sided
filters. Clearly, the one-sided filter generates cyclical movements that
are less volatile than those from the corresponding two-sided filter.
On the basis of this comparison, we can consider an ad hoc adjustment
to the one-sided filter so as to replicate the amount of business cycle
volatility obtained from the more accurate two-sided filter. As shown in
figure 2, the series generated by the one-sided filter is strongly correlated
with the series from the two-sided filter, but the series generated by the
one-sided filter is less volatile. In particular, for the postwar period 1954–
2001, the plotted deviations from trend, (ct ⫺ C t)/c 0(1 ⫹ g)t, have standard deviations of 0.55 and 0.65 for the one- and two-sided filters, respectively. We can scale up the volatility of business cycles by multiplying
the cyclical deviations by a constant v 1 1, so that the cyclical component
is adjusted to become v(ct ⫺ C t).9 Specifically, with v p 1.2, the standard
deviation of the scaled one-sided filter is about equal to the one from
the two-sided filter. A little algebra shows that with this adjustment the
approximate cost of business cycles defined in equation (6) is just mulK
tiplied by v, becoming v(r0 ⫺ y) # 冘kp0 a kk. Thus, to the extent that adjusting business cycles obtained from a one-sided filter requires an increase in standard deviation of 20 percent, the cost of business cycles
is also increased by a factor of 0.2.
An alternative one-sided filter can be obtained from the two-sided
filter by forecasting future values on the basis of available information
at the time of the payout. Under the assumption that consumption
follows a random walk, this would imply that the sum of all the leading
coefficients would be added to a 0, without changing the coefficients
corresponding to lagged values of consumption. As can be shown, for
our case with f(q) the pseudo spectrum of a random walk, this onesided filter equals the one used in this paper.
Overall, we conclude that possible adjustments to the one-sided filter
used in this paper are not likely to result in considerable changes in
the cost of business cycles, as long as the definition of business cycles
is based on the idea of cyclical movements lasting no more than eight
years.
IV.

Durable Goods

In this section we examine the impact of expanding the definition of
consumption to include durables in addition to nondurables and ser8
Note that for this figure and the corresponding calculations, we use filters with K p
5, so as not to lose too many observations. For the period of overlap, the case with
K p 20 (not shown) results in very similar time-series realizations.
9
Note, in this case, that the trend is given by (1 ⫺ v)ct ⫹ vCt.
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vices. We find that stabilizing durable goods consumption creates a
sizable gain when measured in percentage terms of this type of consumption goods. However, because the value of the lifetime consumption of durables is so much smaller than for nondurables and services,
the overall effect on the marginal cost of business cycles is small.
We derive an expression for the marginal cost of fluctuations that
includes both durable consumption goods and nondurable consumption goods and services. We assume that the utility function has nondurables and services, c ns, and durables, c d, and define the cost of fluctuations Q as before:
U([1 ⫹ Q(a)]{c ns}, [1 ⫹ Q(a)]{c d }) p
U((1 ⫺ a){c ns} ⫹ a{C ns}, (1 ⫺ a){c d } ⫹ a{C d }),

(11)

where C ns and C d are the trends in consumption of nondurables and
services and consumption of durables, respectively. As in the previously
discussed case with one type of goods, the marginal cost is obtained by
differentiating (11) with respect to a:

冘 冘

zt苸Z t

t≥1

Q (0) { q
¯0 p

冘 冘
t≥1

⭸U
⭸U
C ns(z t) ⫹ d t C td(z t)
⭸ctns(z t) t
⭸ct (z )

[
[

zt苸Z t

⭸U
⭸U
ctns(z t) ⫹ d t ctd(z t)
ns t
⭸ct (z )
⭸ct (z )

]
]

⫺ 1.

This can be written here as
q
¯0 p

V0ns({C ns}) ⫹ P0V0d({C d })
⫺ 1,
V0ns({c ns}) ⫹ P0V0d({c d })

where P0 is the time 0 spot price of durables in terms of nondurables,
and V0ns and V0d are the prices to streams of nondurables and services
and to durable consumption goods, each in terms of their own time 0
goods’ units, respectively, defined as
V0i({x i}) p

冘冘

1
⭸U i t
x t(z )
i
t
t
⭸U/⭸c 0 t≥1 z 苸Z ⭸cti(z t)

for i 苸 (ns, d), x 苸 (c, C), and
P0 p

⭸U/⭸c d0
,
⭸U/⭸c ns
0

where the utility function U is evaluated at {c ns} and {c d }. The expression
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for the aggregate marginal cost of fluctuations can be written more
compactly as
q
¯ 0 p (1 ⫺ s 0 )qns0 ⫹ s 0 qd0 ,

(12)

where qi0 { V0i({C i})/V0i({c i}) ⫺ 1 for i 苸 (ns, d), and s 0 denotes the share
of the value of the durable consumption equity in aggregate consumption equity, that is,
s0 p

P0V0d({c d })
.
V0ns({c ns}) ⫹ P0V0d({c d })

In our previous sections we have estimated qns0 . Thus our remaining
tasks in order to estimate q̄0 are to obtain empirical counterparts of
qd0 and s 0.
We start by describing our estimation of the cost of fluctuations of
durable consumption qd0. We distinguish between expenditure on durables and durable consumption. Specifically, we assume that consumption services are provided by the stock of durables, which is assumed
to depreciate at a constant rate and to increase by current-period durable expenditures. Then durable consumption, ctd, can be represented
as a one-sided moving average of current and past expenditures, et⫺j, on
consumer durables ctd p 冘jp0 d j et⫺j.10 The value of a claim to lifetime
durable consumption is computed in two steps. First, we estimate the
value of lifetime durable expenditure the way we did in Section II for
the consumption of nondurables and services. Second, following the
derivations in proposition 1, we can write the value of lifetime durable
consumption as a linear function of the value of lifetime durable expenditure, with the linear coefficient functions of {d j }, y, and g. Indeed,
this is possible because durable consumption is specified as a one-sided
moving average of expenditure, just as the consumption trend has been
specified as a one-sided moving average of consumption.
Table 4 reports the estimated price of a claim to durable consumption
in terms of durable consumption by using the corresponding yields,
r0d ⫺ y, as in tables 1 and 2. The estimated risk premium for durable
consumption goods is between 0.45 percent and 1.48 percent based on
the spanned part, with upper good-deal bounds between 5.77 percent
and 6.49 percent. These values are more than three and seven times
higher than the risk premiums estimated for consumption of nondurables and services. The main reason for the increase is the higher
volatility of the growth rates of durable expenditure, which have an
annual standard deviation of 6.7 percent compared to only 1.16 percent
for nondurables and services, for the sample covering 1954–2001. Col10
We end up truncating the lags at 10 years for the computations. We found that the
truncation lag was not quantitatively important.
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TABLE 4
Marginal Cost of Fluctuations in Durable Good Consumption, q (1954–2001):
yp5.08, gp4.34
q
r⫺y

IID case
VAR(1)
Regime switching

Business Cycles

%
(1)

Upper
Bound (%)
(2)

R2
(3)

1.43
.45
1.48

5.77
6.58
6.49

.31
.03
.31

All Uncertainty

%
(4)

Upper
Bound (%)
(5)

%
(6)

Upper
Bound (%)
(7)

.53
.17
.55

2.13
2.43
2.40

194.96
61.92
200.90

785.42
896.47
883.80

Note.—r ⫺ y is the consumption risk premium; for the non-IID cases it is the unconditional mean obtained from
the model. The return used is the CRSP value-weighted return covering the NYSE and AMEX. R 2 is taken from the
regression of growth rates of durable consumption expenditure on returns for the IID case; otherwise, it is the unconditional mean of the one-step-ahead R 2 obtained from the model. All returns are real.

umns 4 and 5 of table 4 display estimates of the business cycle cost
qd0 using the same weights {a k } as in tables 1 and 2.
We estimate the average of the value share of durable consumption
equity in total consumption equity s 0 to be 6 percent and 4.3 percent
corresponding, respectively, to the spanned part and the upper-bound
estimates from the IID cases in tables 1 and 4. These shares are smaller
than the average expenditure share for durable consumption, which
for the postwar period is about 13 percent of total consumption expenditure. The reason is that the price-consumption ratios for durables
V0({c d })/c 0d are smaller than V0({c ns})/c ns
0 , the counterparts for nondurables
and services. See Appendix F for more details about the calculation of
s 0.
Finally, combining the estimates of qns0 , qd0, and s 0 as in equation (12),
we can compute an estimate for the aggregate cost of fluctuations including both durable and nondurable consumption goods. For the IID
case, we estimate the aggregate cost q̄0 to be 0.10 percent based on the
prices for the spanned parts; this is higher than the corresponding
estimate of qns0 p 0.07 percent for nondurables and services in table 1.
When the estimates based on the upper bound of r0 ⫺ y are used, the
aggregate cost is q
¯ 0 p 0.51 percent, compared to the corresponding
qns0 p 0.44 percent for nondurables and services in table 1. We conclude
that adding durable consumption goods does not significantly change
our estimates.
V.

Comparing Marginal Cost and Total Cost of Consumption
Fluctuations

In this section, we present some results about the properties of the
marginal cost function that allow us to link our approach more closely
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to the large literature that has focused on computing total costs in the
line of Lucas (1987). Our main result is a set of conditions under which
the marginal cost is an upper bound for the total cost. We also present
an example for the cost of all uncertainty with expected, time-separable
utility. In this case, we show that the marginal cost equals twice the total
cost up to a second-order approximation.11
We start this section by comparing our approach to that of Lucas
(1987). For that purpose, we define the total cost of consumption fluctuations as Q(1), that is, U([1 ⫹ Q(1)]{c}) p U({C }). Defining the trend consumption to be {C } p {E 0(c)}, that is, where C(z t) p E 0(ct) for all t and
z t, we obtain
U([1 ⫹ Q(1)]{c}) p U({E 0(c)}),

(13)

which is Lucas’s definition of the cost of business cycles. Thus Lucas’s
definition can be seen as the total benefit associated with eliminating
all the consumption fluctuations, that is, a p 1, and consumption fluctuations are defined as consumption uncertainty, that is, resulting in
the exchange of consumption for its expected path.
Note that the specification in equation (13) differs slightly from
Lucas’s and the literature’s standard specification because we have chosen to begin compensation as of t p 1; the standard has been to start
compensation at t p 0. We choose this departure because our definition
is more consistent with the idea of ex-dividend security prices, and some
of our qualitative results present themselves more tractably with our
definition. In any case, the quantitative difference between Lucas’s definition and ours should be insignificant.
We provide here also an alternative interpretation of our marginal
cost q 0 that is valid with incomplete markets. For that purpose, assume
that for individual agents indexed by i, consumption is given as c i p
c ⫹ ei, where ei is the idiosyncratic component and c p C ⫹ d, so that d
stands for the deviation from the (aggregate) trend. To save on notation,
we omit time subscripts. If we then define Q as compensating only the
aggregate component {c}, so that
U i({[1 ⫹ Qi(a)]c ⫹ ei}) p U i((1 ⫺ a){c i} ⫹ a{C ⫹ ei}),
and if we assume that all agents i have access to claims paying {c} and
{C }, we have that
Qi(0) p

V0[{C }]
⫺ 1 p q0.
V0[{c}]

Indeed, under the stated assumptions, even with agents subject to pos11
Additional results, for instance, about consumption externalities, are available in our
working paper (Alvarez and Jermann 2000).
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sibly uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, they would end up equalizing their
valuations for {c} and {C }.
A.

Homothetic Preferences and Scale-Free Cost Functions

To analyze the marginal cost function, we make the following initial
assumptions: U({c}) is increasing and concave in {c}. We also assume that
the process {C } is preferred to {c}, that is, U({C }) 1 U({c}). If we require
that the cost of fluctuations Q(a) be the same for the processes {c} and
{C } as for the processes {lc} and {lC }, where l is any positive scalar, then
we must impose some additional restrictions on the utility function U.
This requirement implies that the cost of consumption fluctuations will
not differ merely because economies are rich and poor. Specifically, we
require U to be homothetic; that is, U is homogeneous of degree 1 ⫺
g. That is, for any positive scalar l 1 0 and for any process {c}, we have
U(l{c}) p l1⫺gU({c}).
Under these assumptions, we obtain that the marginal cost is higher
than the total cost.
Proposition 3. Assume that U is increasing, concave, and homothetic.
Also assume that {C } is preferred to {c}, that is, U({C }) 1 U({c}). Then
Q(a) is concave, and thus
q 0 { Q (0) ≥ Q(1).
Examples from the literature that satisfy this homogeneity property
are the preferences used in Mehra and Prescott (1985), Epstein and
Zin (1991), Abel (1999), and Tallarini (2000).
B.

Example: Cost of All Uncertainty with Expected Utility

Now we present some implications for the total and marginal cost Q
and Q  with time-separable expected utility. We also assume that the
trend {C } is given by the expected value of consumption; that is, we
evaluate the elimination of all uncertainty. We assume that consumption
fluctuations are small. We show that for an approximation up to the
order of the variance of consumption, the total cost of uncertainty equals
half of the marginal cost; that is, Q(1) p 12 Q (0). In this case, the marginal cost is given by a weighted average of the product of risk aversion
and the variance of consumption for different periods. We also consider
a higher-order approximation to examine the role of skewness in consumption fluctuations. We show that if the period utility function u
displays prudence, that is, u  1 0, and if consumption fluctuations have
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negative skewness, then we obtain a stronger inequality, that is,
Q(1) ! 12 Q (0).12
Consider the one-period case, where consumption is given by c p
c̄(1 ⫹ je) for a zero-mean random variable e. The parameter j indexes
the amount of risk. The trend is given by the expected value, that is,
C pc¯ { E[c]. Notice that the variance of c is proportional to j 2—that
¯ p j 2Ee 2—and that its third moment is proportional to j 3.
is, Var (c/c)
We include j as an argument of the total and the marginal costs, which
are given by
¯ ⫹ je)[1 ⫹ Q(1, j)])] p u(c)
¯
E[u(c[1 ⫹ Q(1, j)])] { E[u(c(1

(14)

and
Q (0, j 2 ) p

¯ ¯
E[u (c)(c¯ ⫺ c)]
⫺E[u (c¯ ⫹cje)(cje)]
{
.


¯ ¯ ⫹cje)]
¯
E[u (c)c]
E[u (c¯ ⫹cje)(c

(15)

¯ ⫹ e))e 4 ] is finite, then
Proposition 4. If E[u (c(1
Q (0, j) p 2Q(1, j) ⫺

¯
j 3 c¯3u (c)
Ee 3 ⫹ o(j 3 ),

¯
6 u (c)

where h(j) p f(j) ⫹ o(j p) means that limjr0 [h(j) ⫺ f(j)]/j p p 0.
The proof is standard, and together with additional examples and
the multiperiod case, it can be found in our working paper (Alvarez
and Jermann 2000).
VI.

Conclusion

The approach developed in this paper allows us to estimate the cost of
consumption fluctuations directly from asset prices. Instead of specifying
and calibrating a utility function, we use the idea of no arbitrage to
compare the value of a claim to lifetime consumption and a claim to
stabilized lifetime consumption. Our two main quantitative findings are
that the elimination of all consumption uncertainty would be very valuable whereas the elimination of consumption fluctuations at business
cycle frequencies is not.
The main reason we find such a large gain from the elimination of
all uncertainty is that consumption and the pricing kernel (i.e., the
marginal utility of wealth) have large permanent components. The main
reason the cost of business cycles is so much smaller is that we define
business cycles to comprise only transitory fluctuations, which are small
12
Rietz (1988) assumes that there is a small probability of a large drop in consumption,
motivated by the Great Depression, and he shows that this leads to a substantial increase
in the equity premium.
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relative to permanent fluctuations. In Alvarez and Jermann (2002), we
directly estimate the importance of the permanent component in the
pricing kernel, and we indeed find it to be large.
Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
⬁
Start by collecting all the terms in {C }tp1
that involve a ct for some arbitrary
t ≥ 1. To do this, consider the dividend paid by the consumption trend asset at
times t, t ⫹ 1, … , t ⫹ K: C t : a 0ct ⫹ …, C t⫹1 p … ⫹ a 1(1 ⫹ g)ct ⫹ …, and C t⫹K p
… ⫹ a (1 ⫹ g)Kc . Owing to the constant interest rates, we can assign a value to
K
t
each of the terms that include a ct through simple replication, so that

V0[C t] p a 0V0[ct] ⫹ … ,
V0[C t⫹1] p

a 1(1 ⫹ g)V [ct] …
⫹ ,
1⫹y

_
V0[C t⫹K] p … ⫹

a K(1 ⫹ g)KV0[ct]
,
(1 ⫹ y)K

where V0[ct] is the price at time 0 of a claim to ct at time t. Clearly,
⬁
⬁
V0[{ct}tp1
] p 冘tp1 V0[ct]. Thus, collecting the terms that have common factor
V0[ct], we get

[

V0[ct] a 0 ⫹ a 1

1⫹g
1⫹g 2 …
1⫹g
⫹ a2
⫹ ⫹ aK
1⫹y
1⫹y
1⫹y

( ) ].

( )

K

There is an expression like this one for each t ≥ 1. The remaining payoffs at
time t p 1, 2, … , K that correspond to consumption values c 0 , c⫺1 , … , c⫺K are
grouped in a similar fashion. Rearranging terms and using the assumption that
1 ⫹ g p c 0 /c⫺1 p c 2⫺K/c 1⫺K, we get
⬁

[{ } ] [

V0

Ct
c0

p a1

tp1

[

1⫹g
1⫹g 2 …
1⫹g
⫹ a2
⫹ ⫹ aK
1⫹y
1⫹y
1⫹y

( )

⫹ a2

( )]
K

1⫹g
1⫹g 2 …
1⫹g
⫹ a3
⫹ ⫹ aK
1⫹y
1⫹y
1⫹y

( )

( ) ]
K⫺1

1⫹g
⫹ … ⫹ aK
1⫹y
⬁

[{ } ][

c
⫹ V0 t
c0

a0 ⫹ a1

tp1

1⫹g
1⫹g 2 …
1⫹g
⫹ a2
⫹ ⫹ aK
1⫹y
1⫹y
1⫹y

( )

( ) ].
K

Equation (4) is derived through the following steps. Using the definition of
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q 0, rearranging terms, and using the definition for r0, (r0 ⫺ g)/(1 ⫹ g) p
⬁
c 0 /V0[{ct}tp1
], gives
r0 ⫺ g 1 ⫹ g
1⫹g
⫹
1⫹g 1⫹y
1⫹y

[ ( ) ]
{ [ ( )] ( )}

1 ⫹ q0 p a 0 ⫹ a 1

r0 ⫺ g 1 ⫹ g
1⫹g
⫹
1⫹g 1⫹y
1⫹y

⫹ a2

2

⫹

1⫹g
1⫹y

2

⫹…
r0 ⫺ g 1 ⫹ g …
1⫹g
⫹ ⫹
1⫹g 1⫹y
1⫹y

( ) ] ⫹ (11 ⫹⫹ gy) }.

{ [

⫹ aK

K

K

Defining

(r1 ⫹⫺ gg)(11⫹⫹rg )

t

w 0,t p

0

0

and replacing it in the last expression gives (4) after some arrangement. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2
Assuming that a 0 p a 1 p … p a K⫺1 p 0 and a K p 1, we can write the last equation in the proof of proposition 1 as

冘 ( ) ( )冘
K

1 ⫹ q0 p

w 0,t

tp1

1 ⫹ r0 t
1 ⫹ r0
⫹
1⫹y
1⫹y

K

⬁

w 0,t.

tpK⫹1

Take the limit as K r ⬁:

冘 ( ) 冘 ( )( ) ( )
( ) 冘 ( ) ( )( )
K

1 ⫹ lim q 0 p lim

Kr⬁ tp1

Kr⬁

1 ⫹ r0 t
r0 ⫺ g
p lim
1⫹y
Kr⬁ tp1 1 ⫹ g

r0 ⫺ g
1⫹g t
r ⫺g
lim
p 0
1 ⫹ g Kr⬁ tp1 1 ⫹ y
1⫹g

p

t

1 ⫹ r0
1⫹y

t

1⫹g
1
1 ⫹ y 1 ⫺ [(1 ⫹ g)/(1 ⫹ y)]

K

p

1⫹g
1 ⫹ r0

K

w 0,t

r0 ⫺ g
,
y⫺g

where we have used that

(11⫹⫹ry ) 冘 w
K

lim
Kr⬁

⬁

tpK⫹1

(11⫹⫹ry ) (11⫹⫹rg ) p lim (11 ⫹⫹ gy) p 0.
K

0

0,t

p lim
Kr⬁

K

K

0

0

Kr⬁

Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3
If U is increasing and concave in {c} , there must exist a utility function v that is
homogeneous of degree one, positive, and quasi-concave and satisfies
U({c}) p

[v({c})]1⫺g
.
1⫺g

To start, we show that Q(a) is concave in a. By homogeneity of U,
[1 ⫹ Q(a)]1⫺g

[v({c})]1⫺g [v((1 ⫺ a){c} ⫹ a{C })]1⫺g
p
.
1⫺g
1⫺g

Thus, after multiplying by 1 ⫺ g , taking the 1/(1 ⫺ g) power, and dividing by
v({c}) on both sides, we obtain that
1 ⫹ Q(a) p

v((1 ⫺ a){c} ⫹ a{C })
.
v({c})

Since v(7) is positive, quasi-concave, and homogeneous of degree one, it is concave. With (1 ⫺ a){c} ⫹ a{C } linear in a, v(7) is also concave in a; thus Q(a) is
concave. Now we use the concavity to obtain the desired relationships:

冕

1

Q(1) p Q(0) ⫹

Q (a)da ≤ Q (0),

0

where the inequality uses Q(0) p 0, the concavity of Q, and a ≤ 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Approximation for the Marginal Cost of Business Cycles
Starting with equation (4) and assuming a ≥ 0 , we obtain the following inequality:

冘 冘 ( )
冘 冘 ( ) 冘 冘 ( )
(冘 ) 冘 ( ) ( 冘 ) 冘 ( )
冘 ( )
⬁

q0 p

tp1

K

w 0,t

tp1

kp0

K

≤

K

w 0,t

tp1

K

p

1 ⫹ r0
1⫹y

min {t,k}

ak

kp0

K

p

1 ⫹ r0
1⫹y

min {t,k}

ak

K

w 0,t

kp0

K

w 0,t

tpK⫹1

ak

kp0

1 ⫹ r0
⫹ 1 ⫺ w 0,t
1⫹y
tp1
k

ak

⬁

⫹

K

1 ⫹ r0 k
⫺1
1⫹y

K

ak

kpa

1 ⫹ r0 k
⫺1
1⫹y

1 ⫹ r0
⫺ 1,
1⫹y
k

ak

kp0

⫺1

(B1)

with equality if a 0 p 1 and a 1 p … p a K p 0. Thus, to the extent that not too
much weight is given to the a’s corresponding to long lags, the inequality is
close to an equality. Moreover, using a first-order approximation around r0 p
y p 0, we get

冘 ( )
K

ak

kp0

冘

冘

1 ⫹ r0 k
⫺1艑
a k[1 ⫹ k(r0 ⫺ y)] ⫺ 1 p (r0 ⫺ y) 7 a kk.
1⫹y
kp0
kp0
K

K
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Appendix C
Recursive Pricing Approaches
We present here our recursive approaches to deriving price-dividend ratios v*
and v. To obtain the price-dividend ratio v*, we define the operator T *:
R ⫹n r R ⫹n given by
T *(v)(s) p b(s)l 7 p(s)
for each s 苸 S, where b(s)l 7 x(z  ) is the linear projection of [1 ⫹ g(z  )][1 ⫹
v(s  )] into x(z  ); that is, it solves
[1 ⫹ g(z  )][1 ⫹ v(s  )] p b(s)l 7 x(z  ) ⫹ u(z  ),
0p

冘冕

s 苸S

x(s , e  )u(s , e  )dF(e Fs  )p(s Fs)

for each s 苸 S, with u orthogonal to x. The price-dividend ratio v* of the spanned
part of the consumption equity is given by the fixed point of T *:
T *(v*)(s) p v*(s).
More explicitly, substitute out b(s):
b(s) p E s[x(z  )x(z  )l]⫺1E s(x(z  ){[1 ⫹ g(z  )][1 ⫹ v(s  )]})
p

[冘 冕
冘冕

⫺1

]

l
 
x(s , e  )x(s , e  )dF(e
Fs )p(s Fs)

s 苸S

#

s 苸S

(x(s , e  ){[1 ⫹ g(z  )][1 ⫹ v(s  )]})dF(e Fs  )p(s Fs).

We now describe a recursion whose fixed point is the price-dividend ratio
vt p V t/ct in the Markov regime-switching setting described above. For this, we
let the stochastic discount factor m t⫹1 p m(et⫹1 , st⫹1) be a function of et⫹1 and
st⫹1 and the price-dividend ratio vt p v(st) be a function of st. We define the
operator T : R ⫹n r R ⫹n as
T(v)(s) p min

冘冕

m苸Rn⫹ s 苸S

m(e , s  )[1 ⫹ g(e , s  )][1 ⫹ v(s  )]dF(e Fs  ) 7 p(s Fs)

subject to
p(s) p

冘冕

s 苸S

冘冕

s 苸S

[m(e , s  )x(e , s  )]dF(e Fs  ) 7 p(s Fs),

m(e , s  )2dF(e Fs  ) 7 p(s Fs) ≤

h(s)2 ⫹ 1
,
(1 ⫹ y)2

where h(s) is the bound on the conditional Sharpe ratio. The lower good-deal
bound for the price-dividend ratio of the consumption equity is the fixed point
of this operator, that is, T(v)(s) p v(s) for all s 苸 S.
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Appendix D
Approximate Consumption Risk Premium

c and R M in the IID case, using
For equation (8), assuming lognormality for c/

E[(c/
c)l[R M ⫺ (1 ⫹ y)] p 0 and the corresponding Euler equation for the return
to the consumption claim, implies that

log

2
1⫹r
j log
1⫹rM
c /c
p
log
.
1⫹y
jlog c /c, log RM
1⫹y

(

)

Using the approximation
2
j log
c /c

jlog c /c, log RM

艑

jc2/c
,
jc /c,RM

and a first-order approximation around zero, r, y, and r M gives the postulated
expression. For equation (9), some algebra implies that

{

r ⫺ y p (1 ⫹ y)

}

1
⫺1,
1 ⫺ (jc /c,RM/j )(r M ⫺ y)[1/(1 ⫹ g)]
2
RM

and a first-order approximation around zero, g, y, and r M gives the postulated
expression.

Appendix E
Filter Coefficients

a p [0.6250 0.2251 0.1592 0.0750 ⫺0.0000 ⫺0.0450 ⫺0.0531
⫺0.0322 0.0000 0.0250 0.0319 0.0205 ⫺0.0000 ⫺0.0173
⫺0.0228 ⫺0.0150 0.0000 0.0133 0.0177 0.0119 ⫺0.0191].

Appendix F
Durable Consumption Shares
Rearranging the expression in the text gives

s0 p

(

⭸U/⭸c d0 d
c
⭸U/⭸c 0ns 0

c ns
0

)

Z[

V0d({c d }) V0ns({c ns})
⫹
c d0
c ns
0

(

⭸U/⭸c d0 d
c
⭸U/⭸c 0ns 0

c ns
0

)

]

V0d({c d })
c d0

for the share of value of durable consumption equity to aggregate consumption
equity. The following steps explain how we find an empirical counterpart to
s 0. Tables 1 and 2 provide estimates for V0ns({c ns})/c ns
0 . In the text we describe how
to estimate V0d({c d })/c d0, which is implemented in table 4. Thus the remaining task
d
ns
is to estimate [(⭸U/⭸c d0 )/(⭸U/⭸c ns
0 )](c 0 /c 0 ), which is the ratio of the value of con-
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sumption of durables to the value of consumption of nondurables and services.
To do this, we assume that the stock of durables evolves as
d
ctd p ct⫺1
(1 ⫺ d) ⫹ et,

(F1)

where d is the depreciation rate. Rearranging the equation, we get

[

ctd p et

]

1
,
1 ⫺ (1 ⫺ d)/(1 ⫹ g td)

d
with 1 ⫹ g td { ctd/ct⫺1
.
In this setting, the per period user cost of the stock of durables, that is, the
cost of having one more unit of durables for one period, measured in units of
the stock of durable goods, is (y d ⫹ d)/(1 ⫹ y d) , where y d is the interest rate of
durable goods. A consumer’s first-order condition for the choice of durables
versus nondurables is

⭸U/⭸ctd(z t)
yd ⫹ d
p Pt de(z t)
,
ns t
⭸U/⭸ct (z )
1 ⫹ yd

(F2)

where Pt de(z t) is the price of durable expenditure goods relative to nondurable
goods. The quantity Pt de(z t)(d ⫹ r)/(1 ⫹ y d) is the relative price of one durable in
period t in terms of period t nondurable goods. Multiplying (F2) by
t
ctd(z t)/ctns(z t) and substituting ctd(z t) in terms of expenditures e(z
), depreciation
t
rate d, and growth rate of durable consumption g td, we obtain
t
⭸U/⭸ctd(z t) ctd(z t)
Pt de(z t)e(z
) (y d ⫹ d)/(1 ⫹ y d)
t
p
.
⭸U/⭸ctns(z t) ctns(z t)
ctns(z t) 1 ⫺ (1 ⫺ d)/(1 ⫹ g td)

We generate a series for g td using durable goods expenditures from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) starting from a level that gives us the
same average growth rate over the sample as for expenditures. For the ratio of
the expenditure of durables to the expenditure share of nondurables and sert
vices, Pt de(z t)e(z
)/ctns(z t), we generate a series from the NIPA counterpart covering
t
the whole period. The average of this series is 0.15, corresponding to a durable
expenditure share of .13 p .15/(1 ⫹ .15). On the basis of depreciation rates
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we choose a constant annual
depreciation rate of 17.5 percent. Note that the main components of the bureau’s reported durable good expenditures based on the first quarter of 2001
are motor vehicles and parts (about 43 percent) and furniture and household
equipment (about 37 percent). Combining the series for
⭸U/⭸ctd(z t) ctd(z t)
⭸U/⭸ctns(z t) ctns(z t)
with the price-dividend ratios in tables 1 and 4 for the IID cases, we report the
sample average for s 0 . Note that the interest rate in durables, y d p 5.08 percent,
is estimated as the sample average of the nominal interest rate minus the inflation of durable good prices; and the growth rate of durables stocks, g p 4.34
percent, is taken to be the average growth rate of durables expenditures.
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